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Abstract
Inclusion of means testing into age pension programs allows governments to better direct
beneﬁts to those most in need and to control funding costs by providing ﬂexibility to control
the participation rate (extensive margin) and the beneﬁt level (intensive margin). The
former is aimed at mitigating adverse eﬀects on incentives and to strengthen the insurance
function of an age pension system. In this paper, we investigate how means tests alter the
trade-oﬀ between these insurance and incentive eﬀects and the consequent welfare outcomes.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the means test eﬀect via the intensive
margin potentially improves the insurance aspect but introduces two opposing impacts
on incentives, the ﬁnal welfare outcome depending upon the interaction between the two
margins. Second, conditioning on the compulsory existence of pension systems, we ﬁnd
that the introduction of a means test results in nonlinear welfare eﬀects that depend on the
level of maximum pension beneﬁts. More speciﬁcally, when the maximum pension beneﬁt is
relatively low, an increase in the taper rate always leads to a welfare gain, since the insurance
and the positive incentive eﬀects are always dominant. However, when maximum pension
beneﬁts are relatively more generous the negative incentive eﬀect becomes dominant and
welfare declines.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D9, E2, E6, H3, H5, J1.
Keywords: Means-Tested Pension, Social Security, Optimal Policy, Overlapping Gen-
erations, Dynamic General Equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
Unlike the U.S.A. and many developed countries in which age pension systems are mainly uni-
versal and pay-as-you-go (PAYG), Australia has a unique means tested pension system. It has
the following distinct features: (i) coverage of the retirement beneﬁts system is not universal
in that only a fraction of the retiree population receives age pension retirement beneﬁts; (ii)
the retirement beneﬁts are dependent on economic status (assets and income) and are directed
towards the poorer elderly; (iii) the pension beneﬁts are independent of individuals’ contri-
bution history; and (iv) the tax ﬁnancing instrument is not restricted to payroll tax revenue
collected from the current working population.
Inclusion of means testing into age pension programs allows governments to better direct
beneﬁts to those most in need and to control funding costs by providing ﬂexibility to con-
trol the participation rate (extensive margin) and the beneﬁt level (intensive margin). This
discrimination in retirement beneﬁts is aimed at strengthening risk-sharing across households
and generations, and fostering individuals’ incentives to work and save as well as minimizing
economic distortions. In this paper, we investigate whether means tested pension systems lead
to favourable welfare outcomes in a dynamic, general equilibrium model. Our goal is to under-
stand how the design of means testing instruments aﬀects individuals’ inter-temporal allocation
decisions and to determine the implications for macroeconomic aggregates and welfare.
Similarly to a universal PAYG pension system, a means tested age pension system provides a
risk-sharing mechanism across households and generations. It provides individuals with a mech-
anism to smooth consumption over the life-cycle when market imperfections are present. How-
ever, diﬀerently from an universal PAYG system, it emphasizes the role of intra-generational
redistribution, e.g., risk-sharing within old generations. The distinctive features of a means
tested age pension program result in a number of new aspects. First, means testing instru-
ments strengthen the redistributive function of a pension system, with emphasis more on intra-
generational risk-sharing. Second, means testing instruments introduce additional eﬀects on
the inter-temporal allocation of labor and consumption as individuals reduce savings and work
to increase the likelihood of receiving pension beneﬁts in retirement. The judgment regarding
the value of a means tested pension program should be based on the welfare eﬀects embodying
the trade-oﬀ between the insurance and incentive impacts.
To that end, we begin the paper with a two period, partial equilibrium model to demon-
strate that means tested pensions create two channels of eﬀects on individuals’ incentives: the
probability of being a pensioner (extensive margin) and the level of pension beneﬁts (intensive
margin). We show that dynamic interactions between these two margins result in opposing
eﬀects on savings. More speciﬁcally, we show that the extensive margin introduces a new
channel of eﬀects that is only embedded in a means tested pension system. On one hand, it
tends to encourage agents to save more to prepare themselves for the possibility that they are
not eligible for pensions; on other hand, it tends to induce agents to dissave to increase their
2chances of receiving a pension. Moreover, the direction of the extensive margin eﬀect depends
on the strength of the intensive margin eﬀect. If the intensive margin eﬀect is relatively less
generous, the extensive margin has a positive eﬀect is positive; otherwise, it has a negative
eﬀect. This indicates that the existence of extensive margin eﬀects potentially mitigates the
adverse intensive margin eﬀects on savings. The total eﬀect depends on how these interactions
combine. The welfare eﬀects of a means tested pension system are dependent on fundamentals
including preferences, endowments, market structures and institutional features.
Next, we quantify these eﬀects in a calibrated model of the Australian economy, taking
fundamental factors into account. We follow the tradition of the dynamic general equilibrium
literature on social security and construct an overlapping generations economy with heterogen-
eous households facing uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings shocks and mortality risk, a perfect
competitive representative ﬁrm and a government with a full commitment technology (e.g.,
Imrohoroglu et al., 1995). We incorporate the main features of Australia’s means tested age
pension system and calibrate our benchmark model to match key features of the Australian
economy. We conduct the following policy experiments: (i) First, we compare steady state
results of an economy with means tested pension with an economy without a pension; (ii)
conditioning on the existence of a pension system, we compare steady state results when vary-
ing the generosity of the maximum pension and taper rates for the income means test. Our
quantitative results are summarized as follows.
First, means testing instruments add new dimensions to the trade-oﬀ between the insurance
and incentive eﬀects, but the ﬁnal welfare outcome depends upon how these new aspects interact
with other features of the overall social insurance system and upon the nature of the economy.1
In our ﬁrst experiment, the results reveal that a non-PAYG pension program with means
testing instruments results in lower welfare outcomes than having no pension. This implies that
means tested pension systems are not socially desirable in our dynamic, general equilibrium
model economy, since the adverse eﬀects on incentives continue to dominate the positive social
insurance eﬀects of pensions even when they are means tested. Consequently, when the pension
program is completely removed eﬃciency gains from increases in savings and labor supply result
in higher consumption and welfare. This ﬁnding is similar to that in the PAYG social security
literature.
1Empirical evidence on the links between earnings tests on savings and labor decisions is well documented.
Neumark and Power (1998, 2000) estimate the eﬀects of means-tested Supplemental Security Income for old age
individuals in the U.S.A. and ﬁnd that these retirement beneﬁts reduce savings and labor supply of those likely
to participate in the program when approaching retirement age. There are also a number of studies exploring
the eﬀects of labor-earning tests on early retirement and the elderly’s working hours in the U.K. Disney and
Smith (2002) ﬁnd that an abolition of the earning test induces older male workers to work 4 more hours a week.
This empirical result is also consistent with the result of previous study by Friedberger (2000). These studies
conﬁrm that earnings tests signiﬁcantly aﬀect savings and labor supply decisions in older ages, especially around
the mandatory age from which individuals are eligible for retirement beneﬁts. Previous analyses of the eﬀects of
means-tested, non-pension beneﬁts (e.g., see Hubbard at el (1995), Powers (1998), Gruber and Yelowitz (1999),
Heer (2002) and Chow et. al. (2004)) also found that the asset test reduces saving incentives of low income
households.
3Second, conditioning on the existence of a pension system, the introduction of means testing
results in non-linear welfare eﬀects of changes in the generosity of the pension system and taper
rates. When the maximum pension beneﬁts are relatively small, the introduction of income
tests (raising taper rates) always leads to a welfare gain as the positive welfare eﬀects from
strengthening risk-sharing and mitigating self-insurance disincentives are always dominant.
However, once the pension beneﬁts become more generous, the negative incentive eﬀects become
more pronounced as taper rates are increased. The underlying economic mechanism behind it
is that the economic distortions of taper rates as implicit taxes on life-cycle savings and labor
supply are more severe when pension are more generous. There is a trade-oﬀ between to these
opposing forces, the ﬁnal welfare outcome depending on the strength of the negative incentive
eﬀects of taper rates relative to the positive insurance and incentive eﬀects. We ﬁnd that there
is an optimal of taper rate that balances these two forces, conditioning on the level of maximum
pension beneﬁts.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the macroeconomics and public ﬁnance literat-
ure. First, our work is closely related to an emerging literature analyzing the eﬀects of means
tested pensions on savings, labor supply and welfare in a life cycle framework. Sefton and
van de Ven (2009) use a calibrated multi-period overlapping generations model to analyze the
eﬀects of a means tested pension reform on life cycle savings and labor decisions in the U.K.
They ﬁnd that tightening of the taper rate for the income test encourages poor individuals to
save more and to delay retirement, while generating opposite eﬀects on the savings and retire-
ment decisions of the rich. Selton, van de Ven and Weale (2008) conduct a welfare analysis
and ﬁnd that means tested pensions are socially preferred to a universal pension in the U.K.
as they deliver better welfare outcomes. Kumru and Piggott (2009) also ﬁnd a welfare gain
from introducing means tests in the U.K. social security system. Kudrna and Woodland (2011)
analyze the general equilibrium eﬀects of changing taper rates of the Australian pension system
in a deterministic overlapping generations model. Maattanen and Poutvaara (2007) study wel-
fare implication of introducing labor earnings tests to the PAYG social security system in the
U.S.A. and ﬁnd negative welfare eﬀects because the adverse eﬀects of the labor earnings tests on
the elderly’s labor supply are signiﬁcantly large. It is noteworthy that these papers emphasize
the eﬀects of taper rates working through the intensive margin, i.e., imposing an implicit tax,
while abstracting from an important channel of eﬀects via the extensive margin. In contrast,
our research extends these papers by highlighting the importance of the extensive margin ef-
fects. We show that the interactions between taper rates and the maximum pension beneﬁt via
the extensive margin results in opposing eﬀects on individuals’ incentives. Subsequently, the
welfare eﬀects of changes in taper rates vary signiﬁcantly over the levels of maximum pension
beneﬁts.
Our study is also related to the literature that undertakes dynamic, general equilibrium
analyses of social security systems. That literature focuses upon universal PAYG social se-
curity systems and consistently ﬁnds negative welfare outcomes when accounting for general
4equilibrium eﬀects. It implies that the adverse eﬀects on incentives tend to dominate the insur-
ance role so that the introduction of an unfunded PAYG social security system usually lowers
welfare. The adverse eﬀects of unfunded social security in dynamic, general equilibrium models
have been well documented (e.g., see Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), Hubbard and Judd (1987),
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Jones (1995), Conesa and Krueger (1999), Krueger (2006) and
Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007)). Note that this literature focuses on the U.S.A.
social security system in which the coverage is universal, and it therefore excludes the eﬀects
coming from the extensive margin. Our study is complementary to that literature as we study
a pension system in which the extensive and intensive margins are both relevant. We show that
interactions between these two margins are important and potentially lead to welfare gains.
Our paper is also linked to the literature on social insurance with means testing. This
literature has focused mainly on disability insurance. Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Dia-
mond and Mirrlees (1986) conclude that optimal beneﬁts are structured so that the healthy are
indiﬀerent as to whether to mimic the disabled or continue working. In a more recent work on
optimal disability insurance, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) also argue that disability insurance
beneﬁts should be asset-tested to prevent individuals from claiming beneﬁts when, optimally,
they should not. This paper follows a similar approach but focus on a pension program. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we analyze the role of means testing in enhancing the social insurance function of
public pensions rather than disability insurance. Nevertheless, we reach a similar conclusion
that the means testing could be used to foster savings and working longer. However, we ﬁnd
that this statement is not universally correct for a pension program, since we identify some
cases in which the introduction of means tests makes the adverse intensive margin eﬀects more
severe and results in a negative overall welfare eﬀect.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present a simple model to highlight
the role played by the intensive and extensive margins arising from a mean-tested age pension
and to derive some analytical results. In section 3 we set up a dynamic, general equilibrium
model that embodies endogenous retirement, earnings uncertainly and a means tested pension
system. Section 4 describes details of our calibration of the model to the Australian economy
and age pension scheme. Section 5 contains the discussion of a range of policy experiments
and results relating to alternative means test parameters. We present conclusions in section 6.
The Appendix provides mathematical details for the theoretical model, and the ﬁscal policy
speciﬁcation and solution algorithm for the dynamic general equilibrium model.
2 A simple model economy with a means tested pension
In this section, we specify a theoretical model and use it to highlight how the inclusion of means
testing into the pension beneﬁt formula inﬂuences individuals’ incentives to save over the life
cycle. In doing so, we are able to emphasize the essential role played by means testing on the
intensive and extensive margins related to pension receipts by the elderly.
5To this end, we consider a simple partial equilibrium economy comprised of agents living for
two periods with endowments of w1 and w2 in period 1 and 2, respectively. At the beginning
of period 1 an agent receives income w1 and makes a decision on consumption and savings to
maximize expected utility, taking the income distribution f (w2) in period 2 and the government
pension policy as given.2 The individual agent’s optimization problem is
max
c1, c2, s{u(c1) + pEu(c2) : c1 + s = w1 − g(τ,w1) and c2 = w2 + (1 + r)s1 + P}, (1)
where p is survival probability, c1 is consumption when young, s is saving, c2 is consump-
tion when old, P is an individual speciﬁc pension beneﬁt, r is the market rate of return on
savings and g(τ,w1) is the tax function with tax rate τ.3 The individual’s standard ﬁrst
order necessary condition for an optimal solution is given by −u￿ (w1 − g(τ,w1) − s) + (1 +
r)pEu￿ (w2 + (1 + r)s1 + P) = 0. The optimal savings decision rule, derived by solving this
equation, is a function of the initial endowments (assumed the same for all agents for simpli-
city), the distribution of endowments when old and the age pension beneﬁt and is indicated by
s∗ = s(w1,f (w2),P).
To aid the exposition, we assume that individuals have quadratic preferences given by
u(c) = −c2/2 + χc, where χ > 0, and that income in period 2 follows a uniform distribution
f (w2) = 1/wmax
2 . Thus, the expected wage income when old is E(w2) = wmax
2 /2 ≡ w2. For
ease of exposition, we also assume that rate of return on investment is r = 0 and that the
survival probability is p = 1, guaranteeing that the economy is dynamically eﬃcient so that
the pension system fails to yields a higher rate of return. We next consider alternative designs
of a public pension program.
Universal PAYG pension and savings. We begin with a universal PAYG pension
program in which the government collects tax revenue from incomes of the young in period 1
(whence g(w1,τ) = τw1) and transfers to every old agent an equal amount of pension beneﬁt,
P = Pmax, i.e., a universal pension. Optimal savings for an agent is simply given by
s∗ =






Variable w2 = wmax
2 /2 is the average (expected) endowment income when old and the whole
term [w2 + Pmax] is the expected income when old. Public pensions discourage individuals save
for retirements as individual’s optimal saving negatively responds to the expected wage income
in period 2, ∂s∗/∂Pmax < 0. Particularly the more pension beneﬁts individuals receive in
period 2 the less they will save in period 1. This is a classic crowding-out eﬀect resulting from
2In the following, we consider a typical agent and so do not distinguish between agents.
3We abstract from the labor/leisure decision to keep the model suﬃciently simple to highlight the channels by
which the design of a means-test pension distorts the savings decision. The labour/leisure choice could readily
be included, but at the cost of simplicity.
6the introduction of a public pension program. Note that, to focus on the eﬀects of pension
program, we abstract from the tax ﬁnancing instrument in this simple example.
The extensive and intensive margins of means tested pensions. We now examine
the salient features of means testing instruments. We ﬁnd that these instruments result in
two separate channels of eﬀects: (i) the number of agents participating in a public pension
program (extensive margin); and (ii) the level of pension beneﬁts (intensive margin). The
latter is comprehensively analyzed in the PAYG social security literature, while the former is
relatively new and only appears when means testing is introduced.
Here, we investigate how these two margins can inﬂuence an individual’s savings decision.
We consider the simplest means tested pension program, in which the government is allowed
to discriminate between income groups to determine the receipt public pension beneﬁts; that
is, the government uses an income test to determine individuals’ pension beneﬁts. To get some
intuition, we start with the very simple means testing rule
P =
￿
Pmax if w2 < y2,
0 if w2 ≥ y2,
(3)
where y2 ∈ (0,wmax
2 ) is the threshold level of income (here labour or endowment income only)
separating pension recipients from non-recipients. This rule state that all agents with income
endowments in period 2, w2, below the income threshold y2 are eligible for an equal amount of
pension beneﬁts. This pension rule separates the elderly population into two group: one deﬁned
as relatively poor and one as relatively rich. With means testing and a uniform distribution for
endowments when old, individuals face the probability of (y2/wmax
2 ) < 1 of being a pensioner.
By discriminating amongst retirees by income, the government is better able to target poor
retirees. Moreover, it also tends to encourage young individuals to save more for their old age
compared to a universal pension scheme. Note that, since the government excludes individuals’
savings from the testable income, it can directly control the number of individuals participating
in the pension program.
With these means testing instruments, the government has two pension policy parameters
that it can adjust: ﬁrst, adjusting the income test threshold, y2, to determine the number of
pensioners (extensive margin) and, second, adjusting Pmax to vary the generosity of pension
beneﬁts (intensive margin). In this simple model, the extensive margin disappears when the
7government sets y2 = wmax
2 or y2 = 0. The household’s optimal saving rule is
s∗ =
[w1 − g(τ,w1)] −
Expected Income
￿ ￿￿ ￿ 
       

Pensioner ￿ ￿￿ ￿
Average income












Non-Pensioner ￿ ￿￿ ￿
Average income

















We now examine how means testing complicates the way that public pension programs
inﬂuence individuals’ saving incentives. We ﬁnd that means testing adds another source of
uncertainty to income in period 2 as the expected income in period 2 depends on the income
threshold, y2, that is set by the government, and this inﬂuences the individual’s saving decision.
More speciﬁcally, as the government adjusts the income test threshold it aﬀects the probability
of being a pensioner and expected income, and thereby aﬀects the individual’s incentive to
save.
To identify these channels through which means testing instruments impact upon individu-
als’ incentives, we take the ﬁrst derivatives of the saving function with respect to the maximum
pension beneﬁt, ∂s∗/∂Pmax, and the income test threshold, ∂s∗/∂y2. The former reﬂects the
eﬀect from the intensive margin, while the latter captures the eﬀect from the extensive margin
(hereafter called the intensive margin and extensive margin eﬀects, respectively).
Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect through the intensive margin is negative as ∂s∗/∂Pmax <
0. We conclude that a public pension program crowds out private savings via the intensive mar-






2 (w2 − Pmax) ￿ 0. Indeed, it is dependent on the magnitude
of the maximum pension beneﬁt, Pmax, relative to the average income in period 2, w2. This
distance (w2 − Pmax) also measures the generosity of the public pension program, i.e., relative
strength of the intensive margin eﬀect. As Pmax becomes relatively more generous, the strength
of the intensive margin eﬀect becomes relative larger. For example, when the maximum pen-
sion beneﬁt is higher than the average income in period 2, Pmax > w2, the pension system
is very generous. The direction of the extensive margin eﬀect depends on the strength of the
intensive margin eﬀect. If the intensive margin eﬀect is relatively less generous (Pmax < w2)





2 (w2 − Pmax), which is positive; otherwise, it is neg-
ative. This result indicates that the existence of extensive margin eﬀects potentially mitigates
the adverse intensive margin eﬀects on savings. However, the ﬁnal eﬀect on saving is not clear
as it depends on how these two margins interplay.
Taper rate and the intensive and extensive margins. We now consider a more
complex means testing rule under which the pension payment depends continuously upon the
8individual’s income. Under this speciﬁcation, That is, the pension beneﬁt declines by ω for
each additional unit of income received, where ω is a taper rate and 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1. Analytically,
the pension beneﬁt is determined by
P =
￿
Pmax − ωw2 if w2 < y2,
0 if w2 ≥ y2,
(5)
where the maximum income threshold is now determined by y2 = Pmax/ω.
The corresponding optimal savings function is given by
s∗ =
[w1 − g(τ,w1)] −
Expected Income
￿ ￿￿ ￿ 
       

Pensioner ￿ ￿￿ ￿
Average income
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
y2
2











Non-Pensioner ￿ ￿￿ ￿
Average income

















The expected income in period 2 now depends on three pension policy design parameters -
the maximum beneﬁt, Pmax, taper rate, ω,and income test threshold, y2. If an individual
is a pensioner,
y2
2 is the expected labor income endowment they will receive; therefore, total












reﬂects the eﬀects of the taper rate, i.e., an implicit tax on individuals’ income. A non-













Inclusion of the taper rate in the pension beneﬁt formula provides the government with
an additional tool to aﬀect both the extensive and intensive margins of a pension program.
The government can vary taper rates to determine the progressivity of the pension pay-
ment schedule. First, the government may use the taper rate to adjust the level of pen-
sion beneﬁts, which directly tunes down the negative intensive margin eﬀect on savings. Fur-












. Again, we ﬁnd that the saving eﬀect via the extensive
margin is dependent on the relative strength of the intensive margin. The extensive margin
eﬀect is positive (∂s∗
∂y2 > 0) only if the pension beneﬁt is relatively less generous enough, rel-
ative to average income in period 2, (Pmax − ωy2 < w2). Compared to the previous means
testing policy, the presence of the taper rate weakens the strength of intensive margin eﬀect.
More speciﬁcally, the government can increase the taper rate to amplify the positive extensive
margin eﬀect, taking the level of the maximum beneﬁt as given. Consequently, this increases
the likelihood that the extensive margin eﬀect is positive.
The extensive margin and savings. In previous cases we implicitly assume that the
government can fully observe labor income endowment in period 2 so that it can freely set the
9income test threshold. We now relax this assumption to consider the case where the government
can only observe total income. The government includes interest income from saving when old
as a part of testable income. The pension payment then becomes
P =
￿
Pmax − ω(w2 + rs) if w2 + rs < y2,
0 if w2 + rs ≥ y2,
(7)
where w2+rs is the testable income, which includes two components: labor income endowment
in period 2 and interest from saving in period 1.
Optimal saving is now implicitly given by equation
s =
[1 + (1 − ω)r]
Pensioner ￿ ￿￿ ￿
Average income
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ w2
2





πp − (1 + r)










Pensioner ￿ ￿￿ ￿
[1 + (1 − ω)r]
2 πp +
Non-Pensioner ￿ ￿￿ ￿
(1 + r)
2 (1 − πp)
(8)
where the probability of being a pensioner is πp = ￿ w2
wmax
2 , ￿ w2 = y2 − rs and the tax function
is assumed to be g(w1,τ) = τw1. Note that the probability of being a pensioner, πp, is now
dependent on the individual’s saving, since the wage rate that separates pensioners from non-
pensioners, ￿ w2, depends on the level of saving 4. Under this new means testing policy, the
government can no longer directly control the number of pensioners in the economy, since the
testable income used by the government to determine the number of agents eligible for the
pension program is now dependent on the level of labor income endowment in old age and
optimal savings of the agents when young, i.e., w2 + rs.
By including interest income from saving in the income test, the government is providing
another (this time, direct) channel through which the means test impacts upon the saving
decision. Under the two previously considered means tests for the age pension the policy
instruments aﬀected the saving decision of the young indirectly through their impacts upon
expected future income. While these indirect impacts remain operational, the new channel or
impact upon the saving decision is direct. Higher saving directly reduces the probability of
becoming a pensioner (extensive margin) and, if the individual is a pensioner, directly reduces
the pension payment (intensive margin).
In responding to a means tested pension policy, individuals optimize their saving for re-
tirement taking into account the eﬀect of saving upon the expected pension payment through
the eﬀect on both the intensive and extensive margins. Individuals can manage their savings
decision to increase the probability of being a pensioner by decreasing saving. In that sense,
the eﬀect of the means test on savings through the extensive margin tends to be negative. On
4See Appendix 7.1 for a complete equilibrium solution.
10other hand, decreasing the probability of being a pensioner lowers expected income in period
2, which may encourage individuals to save more. Thus, this aspect of the means test leads to
two opposing eﬀects on self-insurance incentives to save. The ﬁnal eﬀect on savings depends
on which eﬀect is dominant and how the intensive margin eﬀect interacts with the extensive
margin eﬀect.
Discussion. We demonstrate that means test pensions create two channels of eﬀects on
individual incentives: the probability of being a pensioner (extensive margin) and the level of
pension beneﬁts (intensive margin). We have demonstrated that dynamic interactions between
these two margins result in opposing eﬀects on savings and that the total eﬀect depends in
how these interactions play out in the economy. Importantly, these interaction will depend on
fundamentals of an economy like preferences, endowments, market structure and institutional
settings. To make a judgment on the eﬀects of means tested pension program one should
seriously account for these fundamentals. In the next section, we develop a dynamic, general
equilibrium economy model in which we take into account these factors.
3 A dynamic general equilibrium model
We consider an overlapping generations dynamic general equilibrium model, which consists of
heterogeneous households, a perfect competitive representative ﬁrm, and a government with
full commitment technology.
Demographics. The economy is populated by agents (households) whose ages are denoted
by j ∈ [1,...,J]. Each period a continuum of agents of age 1 are born. The population grows
at an exogenous annual rate, n. All agents face an age-dependent survival probability, spj, and
live at most J periods. When the demographic pattern is stationary, as assumed here, the
population share of the cohort age j is constant at any point in time and can be recursively
deﬁned as µj = µj−1spj/(1 + n). The share of agents who do not survive to age j is ￿ µj =
µj−1 (1 − spj)/(1 + n).
Preferences. All agents have identical lifetime preferences over consumption cj ≥ 0 and
leisure lj, where household leisure time per period for household j is constrained by 0 ≤ lj ≤ 1.
Preferences are time-separable with a constant subjective discount factor β and are given by


















/1 − σ, (10)
where γ is the weight on utility from consumption relative to that from leisure, σ is the coef-
11ﬁcient of relative risk aversion, dpj is the number of dependent children at age j and ξ is the
demographic adjustment parameter for consumption.
Endowment. Agents are endowed with 1 unit of labor time in each period of life that
has eﬃciency (or working ability) denoted by ej. The value of an agent’s period eﬀective labor
services is hj = (1 − lj)ej. When the agent chooses to allocate all time to leisure (lj = 1),
the agent exits the labor market and has retired. There is no mandatory retirement age so
agents may stay in the labor force as long as they choose. The retirement age is endogenously
determined. However, retirement is not required to be irreversible since households may re-





denoting the conditional probability that a person of working ability
ej at age j will have working ability ej+1 when at age j + 1. According to this speciﬁcation,
agents have working abilities that vary by age and change stochastically over the life cycle;
they therefore face idiosyncratic earnings risk, which is assumed to be non-insurable.
Technology. The production sector consists of a large number of perfectly competitive
ﬁrms, which is formally equivalent to one aggregate representative ﬁrm that maximizes proﬁts.
The production technology of this ﬁrm is given by a constant returns to scale production
function Y = F (K,L) = AKαL1−α, where K is the input of capital, L is the input of eﬀective
labor services (human capital) and A is the total factor productivity, assumed to be growing at
a constant rate, g. Capital depreciates at rate δ. The ﬁrm chooses capital and labour inputs
to maximize its proﬁt according to maxK,L
￿
AKαL1−α − qK − wL
￿
, given rental rate, q, and
market wage rate, w.
Means tested pension. In the benchmark economy, the government operates a means
tested pension system similar to the current Australian system. The age pension (social insur-
ance) system is not universal but targets households who have low private retirement incomes
through the use of income and assets means tests. The amount of pension beneﬁt P(aj,yj)
receive at age j varies across individuals and depends on the asset and income tests as
P(aj,yj) = min{Pa(aj),Py(yj)}, (11)
where Pa(aj) is the asset test pension and Py(yj) is the income test pension. Accordingly, the
pension beneﬁt is the smaller of the two pension rates; the strictest test binds. The pension





Pmax if aj ≤ a1,
Pmax − ωa (aj − a1) if a1 < aj < a2,
0 if aj ≥ a2,
(12)
where a1 and a2 = a1 + Pmax/ωa are the asset thresholds and ωa is the asset taper rate
indicating the amount by which the pension is decreased for each additional unit of asset above





Pmax if yj ≤ y1,
Pmax − ωy (yj − y1) if y1 < yj < y2,
0 if yj ≥ y2,
(13)
where y1 and y2 = y1 + Pmax/ωy are the income thresholds, ωy is the income taper rate
indicating the amount by which the pension is reduced for each additional unit of income
above the low income threshold, y1.
Market structure. Markets are incomplete and households cannot insure against the
idiosyncratic labor income and mortality risks by trading state contingent assets. They can,
however, hold one-period riskless assets to imperfectly self-insure against idiosyncratic risks.
We assume that agents are not allowed to borrow against future income, i.e., aj ≥ 0 for all j.
The economy is assumed to be small in the sense that all agents in the economy take the world
prices for traded goods and the world interest rate on bonds, r, as given and independent of
the amount of trade in these goods and bonds. The free ﬂow of ﬁnancial capital ensures that
the domestic interest rate is equal to the world interest rate, which is assumed to be constant.
An implication is that the rental price of capital is then given by q = r + δ.
Household problem. Households are heterogeneous with respect to their state variables
including age, working ability and asset holdings. Let xj = (ej,aj)denote the household’s
state variables at age j. At the beginning of age j the household realizes its individual state
xj = (ej,aj) and chooses its optimal consumption, cj, leisure time, lj, or working hours,





, conditional survival probabilities, spj, the wage and interest rates, and
government tax and pension policies as given.
Households have three sources of incomes: labor earnings, savings and transfers. First, if
households decide to work they supply (1 − lj)ej units of eﬀective labor service to the labor
market, attract a wage rate wt and so earn a gross wage income or labor earnings of (1 − lj)ejwt.
Second, households have the cash balance from savings income available to spend in the amount
(1 + r)aj. Third, eligible households may receive age pension transfers from the government
in amount Pj. Speciﬁcally, agents who are J1 = 65 years of age or older are entitled to receive
the age pension. There is a maximum amount of pension income, Pmax, but the actual amount
of pension beneﬁts varies across individuals and depends on the asset and income tests as
Pj = P(aj,yj), where assessable income for the pension income test is simply labour and
interest earnings, yj = ej (1 − lj)w + raj. Finally, households receive accidental bequests, bj,
as a lump-sum transfer from the government.
Formally, the life-cycle expected utility maximization problem of agent i can be expressed
13recursively as












[aj + ej (1 − lj)w + raj + bj + P(aj,yj) − T (yj) − (1 + τc)cj], (15)
a1 = 0, aJ = 0, aj ≥ 0,





is the expected value function, T (yj) is income tax payment and τc
is the consumption tax rate. Note that individual quantity variables, except for working hours,
are normalized by the steady state per capita growth rate, g.
Fiscal policy. The government levies taxes on consumption and income to ﬁnance general
government consumption and the age pension program. The consumption tax rate is set at τc.
Income tax is progressive and compactly written as
T (yj) = Tk + τk (yj − yk), yj ∈ [yk,yk+1], (16)
where the parameters of this tax function are the marginal tax rates, τk, the tax payment
thresholds, Tk, and the tax bracket income thresholds, yk. It is assumed that τ1 = 0, T1 =




. This speciﬁcation corresponds to a standard segmented-
linear income tax schedule with an initial tax free threshold and marginal tax rates that rise
with taxable incomes. The income tax is set so that the consolidated government budget
constraint is satisﬁed every period, whence














where, µ(xj) is the measure of agents in state xj.
Equilibrium. Given government policy settings for tax rates and the age pension system,
the population growth rate, world interest rate, a steady state competitive equilibrium is such
that
(a) a collection of individual household decisions {cj (xj),lj (xj),aj+1 (xj)}
J
j=1 solve the house-
hold problem (14);5
(b) the ﬁrm chooses labour and capital inputs to solve the proﬁt maximization problem;
(c) the total lump-sum bequest transfer is equal to the total amount of assets left by all the
5In the following, endogenous variables for the household of age j are shown with dependence on the vector
of state variables, xj = (ej,aj), at that age.




Φ aj (xj)dΛj (xj);
(d) the current account is balanced and foreign assets, FA, freely adjust so that 1 + r = Rw;














(1 − lj)ej (xj)dΛj (xj),
and factor prices are determined competitively, i.e., w = FL (K,L), q = FK (K,L) and
r = q − δ; and
(f) the government budget constraint deﬁned in Eq. (17) is satisﬁed.
4 Calibration
This section describes the calibration and parameterization of the model. We calibrate our
benchmark model to match the Australian economy and report the values of key parameters
of the benchmark model in Table 1.
Parameters Model Observation/Comment/Source
Preferences




Share parameter for leisure γ = 0.18 to match labor supply proﬁle
Technology
Annual growth rate g = 0.025 2.65%
Total Factor Productivity A = 1
Share parameter of capital α = 0.4
Annual depreciation rate δ = 0.055 5.5%
Demography
Maximum lifetime J = 14 equivalent to 70 years
Maximum working periods Jw = 9 equivalent to 45 years
Annual population growth n = 0.012 1.2%
Government
Income taxes τj,Tj,yj tax schedules in 2007
Medicare levy τMed= 0.015 1.5%
Consumption tax τc endogenous
Pensions Pmax, taper pension rules in 2007
Government consumption ∆G= 0.14 to match government size
Table 1: Preference and policy parameters
15Demographics. One model period corresponds to 5 years. Households become economic-
ally active at age 20 (j = 1) and live up to the maximum age of 90 years (equal to the maximum
model period J = 14). The survival probabilities are calculated from life tables for Australia.
The annual growth rate of the new born agents (households) is assumed to be 1.2%, which is
the long-run average population growth in Australia.
Working abilities. We use estimates of labor productivities and other key life cycle
proﬁles obtained using data drawn from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in
Australia (HILDA) longitudinal survey (see Wooden and Watson (2002) for more details) for our
model calibration. HILDA is a broad social and economics longitudinal survey, with particular
attention paid to family and household formation, income and work. We use data from the
ﬁrst 7 waves of HILDA surveys in this paper.
Working ability corresponds to the hourly average wage rate, deﬁned as gross labor income
divided by total hours worked. We estimate age-dependent hourly wage rates from HILDA
data. The Markov transition matrix that characterizes the dynamics of working abilities over
life cycle is estimated by a counting method. To make the transition matrix more persistent
we use the average of these estimates. We also make an assumption that labor productivities
from 65 decline at a constant rate, reaching zero at age 80 years.6
Preferences. The utility function has the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form. We
follow previous studies (e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ, 1987) and set the relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient to σ = 4, which implies an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of 0.25. We
follow Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and set ξ = 0.6. The number dependent children dpj is
calculated from HILDA data, using the average numbers of children of ages 0−19 in each age
group, j. We calibrate γ to match work hours on average. The subjective discount factor β is
calibrated to match Australia’s net investment to GDP ratio, which has averaged around 0.27
since 1990 according to Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data.
Technology. We set the capital share of output α = 0.4. The depreciation rate for
capital is determined by the steady state condition and is δ = 0.055. The average annual GDP
per capita growth rate in Australian is 3.3 percent so we set g = 0.033. The total factor of
productivity A is a scaling parameter.
Fiscal policy. We use the tax and pension policy parameter values in 2007 to calibrate
ﬁscal policy in the model. The maximum pension is set at Pmax = $13,314.60. The income
test threshold income is set at y
p
1 = $3,328 and the income taper rate is ωy = 0.4. For the
asset test, the design is relatively more complicated. There are separate asset tests for renters
and homeowners in Australia. In our model, there is no diﬀerence between residential and
non-residential assets so we are not able to directly use the statutory asset test thresholds.
Instead, we choose a1 to match the fraction of pensioners at age 65 years. Assets over this
6More details on the data and estimation methods provided in the Technical Appendix available at ht-
tps://sites.google.com/site/chungqtran.
16threshold reduces pension by $1.50 per fortnight for every $1000 above the limit, implying a
taper rate for asset tests is ωa = 0.0015.
The government collects tax from consumption and income to cover spending on pension
and other government spending programs. The consumption tax rate is set at 10 percent,
which is the statutory goods and services (GST) rate in Australia. The details of pension and
income tax schedule are reported in the Appendix.
Small open economy. The budget constraint for the small open economy may be ex-
pressed in steady state form as 0 = rFA + TB, where FA and TB are the net holding of
foreign assets and trade balance respectively. The right hand side is the current account bal-
ance consisting of net interest receipts plus the balance of trade (value of exports minus the
value of imports) and the left hand side is net capital ﬂows, which are zero. In a steady state,
the stock of foreign asset holding is constant and so 0 = rFA + TB, meaning that there is
a current account balance with interest on foreign assets (if FA < 0) matched by a positive
trade balance. We normalize the world price to 1 and assume that the world (and domestic)
interest rate is r = 5%. The Australian trade balance in the last 15 years is about −1.3 percent
of GDP. Using this fact in the context of a steady state, the net foreign asset is calculated as
FA = TB/r = 0.013 × Y/r > 0, which implies that Australia is a net investor in the world
capital market. However, data on Australia’s international position reveals the opposite - Aus-
tralia is a net borrower from the world capital market. Since our benchmark economy is in
steady state, it cannot accommodate both facts. In the model, we assume that Australia is a
net borrower with 19% of total national assets being foreign-owned.
5 Policy simulations and analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst present the calibration result of the benchmark model and discuss
how our model solution matches the data describing the Australian economy. Next, we spe-
cify, present and discuss various policy experiments constructed to explore the implications
of alternative designs of a means tested pension for macroeconomic variables and household
welfare.
5.1 Benchmark model
Our benchmark model economy is able to match some key features of the Australian economy.
We summarize our calibration results in Figure 1.
Asset proﬁles. In our life-cycle model with income uncertainty and incomplete markets,
individuals accumulate assets in early stages of a life cycle. As seen in panel 1 of Figure 1,
our model is able to generate a hump-shaped pattern of asset holdings over the life-cycle that
broadly matches in the data drawn from the HILDA panel data set.7 However, individuals draw
7Although HILDA is a longitudinal survey, not all questions are asked in every wave. Since waves 2 and 6
17down savings faster in the model than observed in the data because they do not have other
motives to save, such as for bequests or to accommodate other life cycle shocks. De Nardi,
French and Jones (2010), for example, show that bequest motives and health expenditure
shocks are the main determinants of savings behavior of elderly American households. Also,
we do not have compulsory retirement savings via superannuation or housing in our model.
Incorporating these factors would potentially improve the match between model and data
generated asset proﬁles.
Labor market behavior. Our model can match the observed life cycle pattern of labor
market behavior and does a good job of capturing life cycle trends in labor force participate
rates. However, it generates more young individuals participating in the labor force in early
stages of the life cycle. This is primarily due to the assumption of no bequest motive. Since
agents are born with no assets our model, there is very little wealth eﬀect on labor supply
decisions at young ages. Consequently, the new born agents optimally choose to work to
maintain consumption. However, as agents accumulate more assets in middle and older ages,
our model captures the labor force participation rates quite well. Agents between ages 20 and
40 years, on average, supply around 30 hours of work per week. Starting from the late 40s,
agents decrease work hours and when they reach 70 years of age there is virtually no labor
supplied. The model also captures the observed life cycle pattern of labor earnings.
collect information on household assets, we construct the age proﬁles of asset holdings based on data from these
two waves.

























































































Public Pension Participation Rate
Figure 1: The bechmark model and the data
195.2 Policy experiments
We now examine how the salient features of a means tested pension inﬂuence individuals’
incentives to work and save, macroeconomic aggregates and welfare. Our primary focus is
upon the choice of parameters of the Australian age pension system and, more speciﬁcally,
upon whether they can be optimally chosen by the government to maximize the steady state
expected lifetime utility that accrues to an individual.
The design of a means tested pension program as described above involves the setting of
three policy parameters: the maximum pension beneﬁt that an age pensioner may receive,
the threshold below which the maximum pension is, in fact, received, and the taper rate that
reduces the pension above the threshold level. While the Australian system, as modeled here,
has two tests - the income and asset tests - each of which has three such parameters, our policy
experiments will simplify the analysis by concentrating on the design of the income test alone,
keeping the assets test unchanged. In short, our concern is with the choice of values of the
maximum pension, the income test threshold and the income test taper rate.
Thus, our design of a means tested pension program involves setting three policy parameters:
the maximum pension beneﬁt, Pmax, the income threshold, y1, and income taper rate, ωy. To
further simplify the analysis, we restrict attention to the study of the eﬀects of social security
reforms along just two dimensions: the maximum pension beneﬁt, Pmax, and the taper rate,





Pmax if y ≤ y1,
Pmax − ωy (y − y1) if y1 < y < y2,
0 if y ≥ y2,
(18)
where y is assessable income.
In order to understand how a choice of these two policy instruments inﬂuence individuals’
inter-temporal allocations of consumption and hours of work, the insurance-incentive trade oﬀ
and welfare consequences, we implement a number of hypothetical policy reforms. We start
from the benchmark economy with the maximum pension beneﬁt Pmax, benchmark set equal to
25% of average labor income and the taper rate set at ω = 0.4. We then consider alternative
model economies in which we change the values of these two policy parameters.
The eﬀects of maximum pension beneﬁts. In a general equilibrium model, changes
in the levels of maximum pension beneﬁts aﬀect not only the generosity of pension beneﬁts
(intensive margin) but also the number of pensioners in the economy (extensive margin). How-
ever, the eﬀects via the former tend to be strong. To understand the eﬀects of the maximum
beneﬁts we simulate a number of alternative model economies in which we vary the levels of
the maximum pension beneﬁts, while keeping the taper rate unchanged at its benchmark level.
Technically, we index the maximum pension beneﬁt in an alternative economy to that in
20the benchmark economy as
Pmax(ϕ) = ϕPmax, benchmark, (19)
where Pmax(ϕ) denotes the maximum pension beneﬁts in the economy after the reform and
ϕ ≥ 0 is a parameter. Note that there are several special cases: when ϕ = 0 the government
closes the pension program, and when ϕ = 1 it is the benchmark economy. In our experiments,
setting ϕ < 1 implies a lower maximum pension beneﬁt than in the benchmark economy, while
ϕ > 1 implies a higher maximum pension beneﬁt. Any ﬁnancial discrepancy between the
government’s consolidated tax revenues and expenditures are ﬁnanced by a higher or lower
income rate
We report the main aggregate and welfare eﬀects of these experiments in Table 2. The
ﬁrst column speciﬁes the maximum pension beneﬁts relative to the maximum pension in the
benchmark economy. Note that we normalized capital, labor, output (but not expected utility)
in the benchmark model (ϕ = 1) to 100 and so the entries in the table show these variables
relative to 100 for the benchmark model. We format the benchmark values in italics in Table
2.
Pmax(ϕ) = ϕPmax, benchmark
ϕ
Capital Labor Output Expected Utility
0.0 351.3 112.6 177.5 -0.3666
0.2 314.1 111.6 168.8 -0.3837
0.4 250.1 109.3 152.2 -0.4086
0.6 187.9 106.2 133.4 -0.4346
0.8 136.2 102.8 115.1 -0.4617
1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -0.4867
1.25 69.3 96.5 84.5 -0.5193
1.5 47.6 93.4 71.3 -0.5602
Table 2: Aggregate eﬀects when adjusting maximum pension beneﬁts, keeping the taper rate
unchanged at the benchmark level (0.4)
In all the experiments reported in Table 2, we consistently ﬁnd that capital stock, labor
supply and output monotonically increase as the government decreases the generosity of pension
beneﬁts. This indicates that public pension programs result in adverse eﬀects on individuals’
incentives to save and work, thus crowding out savings, labor supply and output. Conversely,
cutting the generosity of a public pension program improves eﬃciency and hence income. We
also run the extreme experiment in which the government closes down the public pension
program (ϕ = 0), shown by the bolded row in Table 2. We ﬁnd that when the public pension
program is completely removed (ϕ = 0), eﬃciency gains from completely removing economic
distortions of public pensions on savings and labor supply lead to the highest attainable income.
These large crowding out eﬀects on savings found in our experiments are primarily due to our
small open economy model assumption. Since the domestic interest rate is equal to the world
interest rate, which is assumed constant, general equilibrium interest rate adjustments are
21removed.
We now turn our attention to the welfare eﬀects. As established in the previous literature,
a social security system is often justiﬁed as a mechanism for sharing longevity and income risks
(social insurance) across households and generations, which potentially improves welfare when
markets imperfections are present. On other hand, however, social security systems are often
criticized as being detrimental to capital accumulation, labor supply and growth because they
distort savings and labor supply decisions (through adverse incentives), resulting in eﬃciency
and welfare losses. The welfare outcomes of a social security system depends how the system
trades oﬀ the insurance eﬀect against the incentive eﬀect.
In our quantitative experimental results reported in column 5 of Table 2, we ﬁnd that
decreasing the generosity of pension beneﬁts (reducing ϕ) always leads to increases in the
expected utilities of individuals so that expected utility is maximized when the public pension
ceases (ϕ = 0). This indicates that the adverse eﬀects on incentives always dominate the
insurance eﬀect even when means testing is present. It seems that means testing strengthens
risk-sharing and incentives via extensive margin eﬀects, but fails to overturn the negative
intensive margin eﬀects.
We conclude that a means tested pension is not socially desirable in our dynamic general
equilibrium economy as expected utility is highest in an economy with no public pension.
This is perhaps not surprising as we learnt from previous studies that general equilibrium
adjustments magnify the crowding out eﬀects of social security systems without means testing
and that negative welfare outcomes are likely. Indeed, the PAYG social security literature
using a dynamic general equilibrium model consistently ﬁnds negative welfare eﬀects because
the adverse eﬀects on incentives dominate the insurance eﬀect (Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987)
and Imrohoroglu et al (1995)), leading to the recommendation that governments privatize their
PAYG social security systems. In that sense, our ﬁnding for an age pension scheme with means
testing is consistent with the previous results in the literature of general equilibrium analysis
of social security without means testing.
The eﬀects of taper rates. We now consider the implications of alterations in the
taper rate for the income test, keeping the maximum pension level unchanged. We start our
analysis with the benchmark economy and vary the taper rate, ωy, over the interval between
0 and 1. Any ﬁnancial discrepancy between the government’s consolidated tax revenues and
expenditures are ﬁnanced by a higher or lower income tax rate. Speciﬁcally, our experiments
include two special cases. When the taper rate is nil, ωy = 0, the government provides a
universal pension. On other hand, when the taper rate is unity, ωy = 1, the government
imposes a 100 percent tax rate on pensioners’ incomes above the income threshold - any extra
income obtained is taxed so there is no incentive to earn extra income from working more or
to have extra interest income.
As already argued, the introduction of a taper rate to the pension design results in two
22opposing eﬀects. First, since the resulting means test targets lower income agents (extensive
margin), it mitigates self-insurance disincentives, lowers the deadweight loss of tax ﬁnancing,
and strengthens intra- and inter-generational risk-sharing. Second, it creates economic distor-
tions as it imposes a higher implicit income tax (by the amount of the taper rate) on savings
and labor incomes of pensioners. When the former eﬀect is dominant, the welfare eﬀects are
positive; otherwise, the welfare eﬀects will be negative. In this experiment, we examine how
these two eﬀects interplay. Note that in these experiments we only focus on the eﬀects triggered
by taper rates as we keep the maximum pension level unchanged.
We report the results of these experiments in Table 3. Column 1 speciﬁes the various values
of the income taper rate. Columns 2 to 5 present the values of aggregate variables including
capital, labor, output and expected utility. Again, we normalized the values of aggregate
variables in the benchmark economy (ωy = 0.4) to 100, which are shown in italics in row 5,
and report those in alternative economies relative to the benchmark.
Taper rates (ωy) Capital Labor Output Expected Utility
0.0 92.3 99.6 96.6 -0.4867
0.1 95.9 99.7 98.1 -0.4826
0.2 98.2 99.7 99.1 -0.4802
0.3 99.9 100.04 99.99 -0.4785
0.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 -0.4787
0.5 99.3 99.92 99.7 -0.4797
0.6 97.5 99.8 98.9 -0.4820
0.7 96.8 99.8 98.6 -0.4829
0.8 96.1 99.81 98.2 -0.4840
0.9 95.2 9.82 97.9 -0.4851
1.0 94.6 99.8 97.7 -0.4860
Table 3: Aggregate eﬀects when adjusting the taper rate
First, we analyze whether the current means tested pension system in Australia would
deliver a more favourable outcome than a universal pension system like the one in the U.S. We
compare row 2 (ωy = 0) and row 6 (ωy = .4) and ﬁnd that removing the income test results
in a lower capital stock and labor supply, causing output to drop by 3.5 percent. We also
ﬁnd that expected utility is lower in the economy with a universal pension system than in the
benchmark economy, meaning that newly born agents would prefer to live in the benchmark
economy. We conclude that the means tested pension system in the benchmark economy is
socially preferred to the universal pension system.
Second, we consider a wider range of alternative means tested systems and ﬁnd changing
taper rates results in non-linear eﬀects on individuals’ behavior and macroeconomic aggregates.
When the government raises the taper rate from 0.4 to 1, there is a decrease in the capital stock
and labor supply. This suggests that the economy is in a region in which the adverse eﬀects of
the taper rate as an implicit tax dominate the eﬀect of the taper rate via the extensive margin.
23Raising the taper rate therefore discourages individuals from saving more or working longer,
as they face a higher eﬀective marginal income tax rate on earnings in old ages. This result
is consistent with previous work on means tested pensions by Selton, van de Ven and Weale
(2008), who analyze a calibrated multi-period overlapping generations model of the U.K. and
ﬁnd that the pension reform encourages poorer individuals to save more and to delay retirement,
while generating opposite eﬀects on the savings and retirement decisions of richer individuals.
We ﬁnd that the welfare eﬀects have a hump-shaped pattern. Starting from the benchmark
taper rate, ωy = 0.4, the expected utility for a household decreases as taper rates are increased.
This implies that the adverse incentive eﬀects of the more stringent income test dominant the
insurance eﬀect. On other hand, however, we ﬁnd the opposite outcome as the taper rate is
reduced from 0.4 to 0. Looking at the whole range for the taper rate, we observe that the
introduction of, and increase in, a small taper rate at ﬁrst improves expected utility for the
household, reaches a maximum, and then decreases welfare at higher taper rates.
This non-linear pattern of welfare eﬀects of changes in the income taper rate clearly indicates
a trade oﬀ between the insurance and incentive aspects of means testing. When the economy
is in a region where the insurance eﬀects are dominant, increases in the taper rate induce
more self-insurance by working longer hours and increasing saving, which, in turn, lead to
eﬃciency gains and a positive welfare outcome. However, when the taper rate becomes bigger,
distortions arising from having higher eﬀective marginal tax rates become more severe, which,
in turn, reduce savings and labor supply. Aggregate capital, labor supply and income decrease
and welfare subsequently decreases.
The point at which expected utility reaches a maximum is around ωy = 0.3. This indicates
that the introduction of means testing (via a taper rate) is socially desirable in our model,
conditioning the pre-existence of a pension system with the benchmark level of the maximum
pension beneﬁt. Sefton and Ven (2009) conduct a welfare analysis in a partial equilibrium model
of the U.K. pension system and also ﬁnd that means tested pensions are socially desirable. Our
analysis of the Australian pension system in a general equilibrium framework also reaches a
similar conclusion. This suggests that the conclusions of Sefton and Ven obtained with a partial
equilibrium model might well be conﬁrmed when accounting for dynamic general equilibrium
adjustments.
Interactions between maximum pension beneﬁts and taper rate. We now turn
our attention to interactions between maximum pension beneﬁts and taper rate, and derive
implications for the insurance-incentive trade oﬀ and welfare. We numerically characterize two
steady states economies with two diﬀerent levels of the maximum pension beneﬁts: low ϕ = .5
and high ϕ = 1.5. In each alternative economy, the government keep the maximum pension
beneﬁts unchanged and the government varies the taper rate between 0 and 1.
We report the eﬀects of alternative taper rates and maximum pension beneﬁts in the design
of means testing of the age pension on the aggregate capital stock and labor supply in Table 4.
24Capital Labor
Taper rate Low Benchmark High Low Benchmark High
0.0 1.3490 .7842 .4003 .1729 .1623 .1556
0.1 1.4605 .8148 .4075 .1741 .1630 .1561
0.2 1.5315 .8346 .4088 .1748 .1637 .1564
0.3 1.5760 .8491 .4081 .1753 .1641 .1565
0.4 1.5974 .8499 .4050 .1754 .1643 .1565
0.5 1.6125 .8443 .4011 .1756 .16427 .1564
0.6 1.6161 .8284 .3941 .1758 .16424 .1563
0.7 1.6257 .8230 .3829 .1759 .16421 .1563
0.8 1.6309 .8165 .3775 .1760 .1642 .1562
0.9 1.6371 .8093 .3729 .1761 .1641 .1561
1.0 1.6405 .8039 .3667 .1762 .1640 .1560
Table 4: Aggregate capital stocks and labor when adjusting tapter rates in three diﬀerent
economies: low, benchmark and high maximum pension beneﬁts.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of changes in the taper rates on the aggregate capital stock and labor
supply vary signiﬁcantly across the economies. In the economy where the level of maximum
pension beneﬁts is relatively low, the taper rate that maximizes the capital stock and labor
supply is 1, which is much higher than in the benchmark economy. On other hand, in the
economy where the level of maximum pension beneﬁts is relatively high, the taper rate that
maximize the levels of aggregate capital and labor is around 0.3. This indicates that the eﬀects
of means testing on incentives to work and to save are dependent of the levels of maximum
pension beneﬁts. When the levels of maximum pension beneﬁts are relatively low, tightening
the taper rate leads to an increase in the capital stock and labor supply. The intuition for
this result can be explained by the prediction in our simple model. That is, when the pension
beneﬁts Pmax are relatively less generous the positive extensive margin eﬀect is positive and
always dominates the negative intensive margin eﬀects. On other hand, in the economy where
the levels of maximum pension beneﬁts are relatively generous (benchmark or high) there is
a trade oﬀ between two opposing forces. The positive extensive margin eﬀect tends to be a
dominant force when the rate rates are small, but loses ground to the negative intensive margin
eﬀects as the taper rate becomes suﬃciently high (0.4 or above in the benchmark economy).
This result conﬁrms that the existence of the extensive margin embedded in a means tested
pension system potentially mitigates the adverse intensive margin eﬀects on savings.
We now analyze the welfare outcome in which the interactions between the insurance and
incentive eﬀects are taken into account. Our results for the eﬀect of these diﬀerent policy
settings upon expected utility are summarized in Table 5.
We ﬁnd that the welfare eﬀects of varying the taper rate are diﬀerent across the three
economies and, hence, dependent upon the levels of the maximum pension beneﬁt. In the ﬁrst
economy where the maximum pension beneﬁts are relatively less generous (Low), increases in
the taper rate lead to monotone increases in capital stock, labor supply, national income and,
25Maximum Pension
Taper rate Low (50%) Benchmark (100%) High (150%)
0 -.4086 -.4867 -.5602
0.1 -4012 -.4826 -.5580
0.2 -3969 -.4802 -.5577
0.3 -.3947 -.4785 -.5581
0.4 -.3940 -.4787 -.5593
0.5 -.3935 -.4797 -.5607
0.6 -.3927 -.4820 -.5631
0.7 -.3917 -.4829 -.5669
0.8 -.3911 -.4840 -.5688
0.9 -.3907 -.4851 -.5706
1.0 -.3900 -.4860 -.5727
Table 5: The eﬀects on expected utilities when adjusting tapter rates in three diﬀerent eco-
nomies: low, benchmark and high maximum pension beneﬁts.
therefore, expected utility. This implies that the eﬀects of higher taper rates in mitigating self-
insurance disincentives and strengthening risk-sharing are always dominant so that the welfare
eﬀects are always positive. The optimal taper rate in this economy is ωy = 1. There is no
clear trade oﬀ between insurance and incentive eﬀects as the taper rate increases. However, as
pointed in the previous analysis, the positive extensive margin eﬀects tend to be a dominant
force.
In the third economy where the maximum pension beneﬁts are assumed to be 150% more
generous than in the benchmark economy (High), we again ﬁnd a hump-shaped pattern of wel-
fare eﬀects. This is indicative of the two opposing eﬀects of means testing at work: mitigating
self-insurance disincentives and strengthening risk-sharing versus distortions of higher eﬀective
marginal income tax rates of the higher taper rate. When the former is dominant the welfare
eﬀects are positive; otherwise, they are negative. The insurance and incentive eﬀects are evenly
balanced around ϕ = 0.2, which is the optimal taper rate in this economy. Note that the taper
rate that delivers the best welfare outcome is not necessarily the one that results in highest
levels of capital stock, labor supply and output. The diﬀerence is partly due to the fact that
means testing strengthens the social insurance role of the pension system.
To enable a more detailed examination of the welfare and macroeconomic implications of
alternative pension design parameters, we simulate a number of alternative economies for a
wider range of maximum pension beneﬁts. We summarize the results of these policy exper-
iments on aggregate variables in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11. Table 11 shows that the level of
expected utility is greatest when the taper rate is unity for age pension replacement rates up
to 0.6, indicating that it is optimal for pensioners to only receive the pension for incomes less
than the income threshold. The optimal taper rate is 0.5 when the replacement rate is 0.8,
drops to 0.3 for replacement rates of unity and 1.25, and further to 0.2 when the replacement
rate is 1.5. Thus, the optimal taper rate falls as the pension becomes more generous. Overall,
26we ﬁnd from these tables that the interaction between the maximum pension beneﬁt and the
taper rate magniﬁes the disincentive eﬀects of the taper rate as an implicit tax on life-cycle
savings and labor supply.
In summary, our results point out the importance of accounting for the interaction between
these two pension policy instruments and of analyzing the economic mechanisms that explain
these nonlinear eﬀects. Our results point to a conclusion that the welfare eﬀect of introducing
and increasing an income test taper rate is nonlinear and dependent of the level of the maximum
pension beneﬁt. The interaction between these two policy variables is important as it has
diﬀerent implications for individuals’ inter-temporal allocation of resources, macroeconomic
aggregates and welfare.
6 Conclusion
Inclusion of means testing into the pension beneﬁt formula allows governments to have ad-
ditional policy instruments to aﬀect the number of public pensioners (extensive margin) and
the beneﬁt level (intensive margin). The former is aimed at strengthening risk sharing across
individuals and generations and to mitigate the adverse eﬀects of self-insurance incentives. In
this paper, we analyzed the welfare implications of these salient features of age pension design
for the trade oﬀ between insurance and incentive eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the extensive margin
strengthens the insurance eﬀect but introduces two opposing eﬀects on incentives, and that the
magnitude of the positive extensive margin eﬀect depends on relative strength of the intensive
margin. The ﬁnal welfare outcome depends how two opposing eﬀects on incentives play out in
the economy.
We investigate these trade-oﬀs in a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents that is calibrated to the Australian economy. We ﬁnd that the introduction of a taper
rate leads to positive welfare outcomes and that the pattern of welfare eﬀects varies, depending
on the level of maximum pension beneﬁts. More speciﬁcally, when the maximum pension
beneﬁt is relatively less generous, increases in taper rates always leads to a welfare gain as the
insurance eﬀect together with the positive incentive eﬀect are always dominant. However, when
the maximum pension beneﬁts are relatively more generous, there is an optimal taper rate at
which the insurance and positive incentive eﬀects eﬃciently trade oﬀ with the negative incentive
eﬀects and at which expected utility is maximized. Importantly, our results reveal that the
interactions between the levels of maximum pension beneﬁts and taper rates are critical in
forming the direction of the welfare eﬀects.
Our results carry important policy implications. Countries that are interested in introducing
means testing to their currently universal pension systems should take into account the potential
interactions between the choice of taper rates and the choice of the levels of maximum pension
beneﬁt. Our results highlight the point that the eﬀects of a higher taper rate on savings, labor
supply and household welfare are nonlinearly dependent on the level of the maximum pension
27beneﬁt.
References
Auerbach, J. Alan and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ. 1987. Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Conesa, Juan and Dirk Krueger. 1999. “Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents.”
Review of Economics Dynamics 2:757—795.
De Nardi, Mariacristina, Eric French and B. John Jones. 2010. “Why Do the Elderly Save?
The Role of Medical Expenses.” Journal of Political Economy 118(1):39—75.
Diamond, Peter and James Mirrlees. 1978. “A model of social insurance with variable retire-
ment.” Journal of Public Economics 10(3):295—336.
Diamond, Peter and James Mirrlees. 1986. “Payroll-Tax Financed Social Insurance with Vari-
able Retirement.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 88(1):25—50.
Fuster, Luisa, Ayse Imrohoroglu and Selahattin Imrohoroglu. 2007. “Elimination of Social
Security in a Dynastic Framework.” Review of Economic Studies 74 (1):113—145.
Golosov, Mikhail and Aleh Tsyvinski. 2006. “Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case
for Asset Testing.” Journal of Political Economy 114 (No 2):257—279.
Hubbard, R. Glenn and Kenneth Judd. 1987. “Social Security and Individual Welfare.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 77(4):630—646.
Imrohoroglu, Ayse, Selahattin Imrohoroglu and Douglas H. Jones. 1995. “A Life Cycle Analysis
of Social Security.” Economic Theory 6(1):83—114.
Krueger, Dirk. 2006. “Public Insurance against Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Risk: The Case
of Social Security and Progressive Taxation.” CESifo Economic Studies 52:587—620.
Kudrna, George and Alan Woodland. 2011. “An Intertemporal General Equilibirum Analysis
of the Australian Age Pension Means Test.” Journal of Macroeconomics 33:61—79.
Kumru, Cagri and John Piggott. 2009. “Should Public Retirement Provision Be Means-tested?”
ASB Research Paper No. 2009 AIPAR 01.
Maattanen, Niku and Panu Poutvaara. 2007. “Should Old-age Beneﬁts Be Earnings-tested?”
IZA Discussion Papers 2616.
Nishiyama, Shinichi and Kent Smetters. 2007. “Does Social Security Privatization Produce
Eﬃciency Gain?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:1677—1719.
28Sefton, James and Justin van de Ven. 2009. “Optimal Design of Means-Tested Retirement
Beneﬁts.” The Economic Journal 119(541):461—481.
Selton, Jam, Justin van de Ven and Martin Weale. 2008. “Means Testing Retirement Beneﬁts:
Fostering Equity or Discouraging Savings?” Economic Journal 118(528):556—590.
Wooden, M., S. Freidin and N. Watson. 2002. “The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics
in Australia (HILDA) Survey: Wave 1.” Australian Economic Review 35:339—348.
297 Appendix
7.1 Solving the simple model
We provide a solution for a model in which savings is incorporated in the income test formula
and the government ﬁnances its pension program via a tax on the labor income of the young.
Household. The individual agent’s optimization problem is
max
c1, c2, s{u(c1) + pEu(c2) st. c1 + s = (1 − τ)w1 and c2 = w2 + (1 + r)s + P},
where P is the pension beneﬁt deﬁned as
P =
￿
Pmax − ω[w2 + rs] if w2 + rs < y2
0 if w2 + rs ￿ y2.
Let y2 = w2 + rs be testable income and follows an uniform distribution. Assuming that
u(c) = −c2
2 + χc is the functional form for individual preferences, the individual’s ﬁrst order
necessary condition for optimality is








































: uniform ∼ [ymin
2 = rs,ymax
2 = rs + wmax
2 ].
The individual’s consumption in period 2 is
c2 =
￿
(1 − ω)w2 + [1 + (1 − ω)r]s + Pmax if P > 0
w2 + (1 + r)s if P = 0,





1 + (1 − ω)r if P > 0
(1 + r) if P = 0.

















[y2 + s]f (y2)dy2.
The individual’s ﬁrst order necessary condition becomes




















Let ￿ w2 = y2 − rs denote the level of income endowment in period 2 that separates pension-
ers from non-pensioners, taking saving, s, as given. Noting that dy2 = dw2, we obtain the
expression
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This equation may be solved for the optimal level of saving function, yielding the implicit
31expression
s =
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￿
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where ￿ w2 = y2 − rs.

















































where s is optimal saving and ￿ w2 = y2 − rs.
Equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions for this simple economy reduce to
s∗ =

























































2 = y2 − rs∗. (22)
These equilibrium conditions simultaneously determine the solutions for (s∗,τ∗, ￿ w∗
2). The ﬁrst
is the optimal saving function. The second equation determines the tax rate, τ∗, that ensures
a government budget balance. The ﬁnal equation determines the period 2 (extensive margin)
wage rate, ￿ w∗
2, that separates pensioners from non-pensioners. Note that Pmax, ω and y2 are
exogenously set by the government.
327.2 Fiscal policy in the dynamic general equilibrium model
Means tested pension. The Australian government runs a means tested age pension pro-
gram. The maximum pension is set at Pmax = $13,314.60 in 2007, which is technically is
calculated by the formula Pmax = 0.25 × MTAWE, where MTAWE is the Male Total Av-
erage Weekly Earnings. We assume that is MTAWE is the average labor income y and the
replacement rate Ψ = 0.25. In our benchmark model, the maximum pension is deﬁned by
Pmax = 0.25y. In 2007-8 the income test threshold is set at $3328 and incomes over these
amounts reduce pension by $0.4 for every $1. We therefore choose y1 = $3328 and ωy = 0.4.
The pension beneﬁt using the income test is given by
Py(yj) =
￿
13,314.6 if j ≥ 60 and yj ≤ y1 = 3328,
max[0, (13314.6 − 0.4(yj − y1))] if j ≥ 60 and yj > y1 = 3328.
There are two separate asset tests for renters and homeowners in Australia. For renters,
the asset test threshold was $171,750 in 2007. For homeowners, residential assets are excluded
from the assets test and so the lower bound threshold for the asset test for homeowners is
set higher at $296,250. Assets above the asset test threshold reduce the age pension by $1.5
per fortnight for every $1000 above the limit, which implies a taper rate for the asset test of
ωa = 1.5/1000 = 0.0015. In our model, there is no diﬀerence between residential and non-
residential assets, so we are not able to use the statutory asset test threshold directly. Instead,
we choose a1 to match the observed fraction of pensioners at age 65 years. The pension beneﬁt
using the asset test is given by
Pa(aj) =
￿
13314.6 if j ≥ 65 and aj ≤ a1,
max[0,(13314.6 − 0.0015(aj − a1))] if j ≥ 65 and aj > a1.
The government collects tax from consumption and income to cover spending on pensions
and other government spending programs. The consumption tax rate is set at the statutory 10
percent.
Income tax function. The Australian income tax schedule is progressive. We use the tax
schedules for 2007-8 in the benchmark model so that the tax function is given by
T (y) =

       
       
0 if y < 6,000
0.15(y − 6,000) if 6,000 < y ≤ 25,000
3,600 + 0.3(y − 30,000) if 25,000 < y ≤ 75,000
17,100 + 0.4(y − 75,000) if 75,000 < y ≤ 150,000
47,100 + 0.45(y − 150,000) if y > 150,000,
where y is taxable income.
Senior Tax oﬀset. The maximum amount of senior tax oﬀset is $2230 and for every
33income dollar above the income limit of $24,876 the tax oﬀset reduces by 12.5 cents so we set
SATOmax = $2,230, ysato













if j ≥ J1 and y > ysato
1 = 24,876
for households of pensionable age j ≥ J1 and zero otherwise.
7.3 Algorithm to solve the dynamic general equilibrium model
We follow the algorithm in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) to solve the model. The general
procedure to solve for general equilibrium is summarized as follows:
1. Discretize the state space of assets as [a0,...,amax].
2. Guess an initial wage rate, w, and endogenous government policy variables while taking
the world interest rate as given.
3. Work backwards from period J to period 1 to obtain decision rules for consumption,
savings, labor supply, and the value and marginal value functions of the household.
4. Iterate forwards to obtain the measure of households across states, using the household
decision rules and the laws of motion for working ability shocks and mortality shocks and
taking the distribution of agents of age 1 as given.
5. Aggregate labor supply and clear the labor market to get a new wage rate; balance the
government budget to determine endogenous government variables.
6. Check the relative change in aggregate variables after each iteration and stop the al-
gorithm when the change is suﬃciently small (10−4 percent). Otherwise, repeat steps
from 3 to 6.
7.4 Additional Tables and Graphs: Policy Simulations
34Maximum Pension - ϕ= Y K H W τC% Gini Welfare
0.0 3.859 2.012 0.955 2.389 0.017 0.548 -0.396
0.2 3.653 1.777 0.946 2.281 0.025 0.560 -0.406
0.4 3.336 1.450 0.932 2.116 0.040 0.578 -0.425
0.6 3.046 1.188 0.914 1.969 0.059 0.589 -0.443
0.8 2.774 0.973 0.894 1.835 0.081 0.599 -0.462
1.0 2.526 0.795 0.875 1.706 0.104 0.605 -0.482
1.2 2.341 0.669 0.864 1.601 0.125 0.614 -0.499
1.4 2.178 0.574 0.849 1.516 0.147 0.623 -0.515
Table 6: Aggregate variables: varying maximum pension beneﬁts while keeping taper rate
unchanged
Taper Rates Y K H W τC% Gini Welfare
0.000 2.554 0.811 0.879 1.717 0.118 0.593 -0.479
0.100 2.558 0.816 0.878 1.722 0.113 0.595 -0.478
0.200 2.560 0.820 0.876 1.727 0.110 0.597 -0.478
0.300 2.577 0.831 0.878 1.734 0.107 0.599 -0.476
0.400 2.564 0.823 0.876 1.729 0.106 0.600 -0.478
0.500 2.547 0.811 0.875 1.719 0.106 0.602 -0.480
0.600 2.537 0.804 0.875 1.714 0.105 0.603 -0.481
0.700 2.526 0.795 0.875 1.706 0.104 0.605 -0.482
0.800 2.519 0.790 0.875 1.702 0.104 0.607 -0.483
0.900 2.512 0.784 0.874 1.697 0.103 0.609 -0.484
1.000 2.494 0.771 0.874 1.686 0.103 0.611 -0.486
Table 7: Aggregate variables: varying taper rates while keeping maximum pension beneﬁts
unchanged
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 ψ=1 1.2 1.4
0 240.677 196.981 161.570 135.668 114.664 98.628 86.369 75.173
.1 240.677 205.170 169.826 141.171 116.291 99.193 86.338 74.732
.2 240.677 208.212 173.434 144.793 119.852 99.706 86.428 74.361
.3 240.677 210.910 174.579 145.780 120.157 101.011 86.268 74.079
ω = .4 240.677 212.001 174.378 146.243 120.380 100.000 85.399 73.265
.5 240.677 213.400 174.856 145.746 119.880 98.541 84.631 72.543
.6 240.677 214.867 175.039 145.471 118.880 97.676 82.447 71.014
.7 240.677 215.989 176.292 144.442 118.280 96.620 81.364 69.803
.8 240.677 216.433 177.005 144.313 117.451 96.019 80.199 69.126
.9 240.677 217.241 177.190 143.949 116.382 95.337 79.101 67.602
1 240.677 217.560 177.376 144.289 115.246 93.726 78.148 66.481
Table 8: Aggregate capital : all experiments
350 .2 .4 .6 .8 ψ=1 1.2 1.4
0 106.495 104.704 103.026 101.592 100.299 99.353 98.608 98.052
.1 106.495 105.291 103.562 102.007 100.672 99.621 98.795 98.168
.2 106.495 105.294 103.875 102.348 100.985 99.861 98.956 98.256
.3 106.495 105.328 103.961 102.524 101.131 100.008 99.070 98.326
ω = .4 106.495 105.401 103.992 102.583 101.189 100.000 99.081 98.340
.5 106.495 105.490 104.038 102.604 101.192 99.993 99.048 98.298
.6 106.495 105.552 104.063 102.601 101.151 99.959 99.025 98.264
.7 106.495 105.603 104.105 102.555 101.092 99.923 98.970 98.173
.8 106.495 105.644 104.146 102.550 101.057 99.876 98.904 98.116
.9 106.495 105.645 104.168 102.527 101.028 99.815 98.835 98.023
1 106.495 105.633 104.186 102.534 100.958 99.743 98.760 97.958
Table 9: Aggregate labor: all experiments
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 ψ=1 1.2 1.4
0 149.490 136.560 124.815 115.259 106.766 99.628 93.915 88.376
.1 149.490 139.083 127.426 117.161 107.245 99.773 93.728 87.986
.2 149.490 140.043 128.726 118.401 108.626 99.851 93.650 87.558
.3 149.490 140.860 129.270 118.804 108.655 100.522 93.442 87.258
ω = .4 149.490 141.255 129.318 119.060 108.724 100.000 93.018 86.733
.5 149.490 141.704 129.545 118.981 108.582 99.340 92.680 86.363
.6 149.490 142.127 129.647 119.031 108.267 98.964 91.850 85.603
.7 149.490 142.493 130.132 118.823 108.187 98.515 91.323 84.969
.8 149.490 142.627 130.439 118.802 107.879 98.263 90.750 84.634
.9 149.490 142.887 130.501 118.721 107.501 97.973 90.196 83.860
1 149.490 142.974 130.585 118.864 107.051 97.264 89.716 83.294
Table 10: Aggregate income: all experiments
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 ψ=1 1.2 1.4
0 83.088 86.759 90.516 93.866 97.203 100.193 102.888 105.849
.1 -0.000 85.986 89.466 93.001 96.882 100.074 102.900 105.996
.2 -0.000 85.720 89.094 92.484 96.218 99.983 102.896 106.144
.3 -0.000 85.495 89.014 92.395 96.216 99.712 103.010 106.268
ω = .4 -0.000 85.430 89.084 92.377 96.217 100.000 103.268 106.598
.5 -0.000 85.316 89.070 92.506 96.354 100.392 103.509 106.858
.6 -0.000 85.188 89.089 92.589 96.586 100.635 104.151 107.403
.7 -0.000 85.076 88.956 92.787 96.730 100.926 104.524 107.854
.8 -0.000 85.110 88.918 92.836 96.916 101.097 104.907 108.111
.9 -0.000 84.998 88.913 92.924 97.159 101.287 105.260 108.693
1 -0.000 84.976 88.909 92.894 97.423 101.724 105.584 109.120
Table 11: Aggregate welfare: all experiments
36